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Game Theory and the Law 
Game theory is applied to many fields of study, including law. It is all together fitting and 
proper to extend this application to the legal negotiation of torts. The success and accuracy of 
particular predictions by such a game would be dependent on the players’ ability to predict the 
value of certain variables. However, with this assumption, if a game exists it could be valuable 
to litigants. It could, first, deduce when a grievance might be settled, and second, suggest the 
manner in which settlement will occur. That is, it could estimate the phase of the process that 
would end a legal dispute (whether after an offer or a court decision) along with the resultant 
distribution of capital. These concrete advantages could be developed if the game included two 
mathematical functions, first, exemplifying a positive correlation between the size of 
settlement windows and the probability of settlement, and second, quantifying the weight of 
those settlements. When solved, the model would predict the best strategy for a rational player 
of the game, one which results in the most desirable equilibrium. It could help litigants decide 
whether to go to court or to settle.  
Note that game theorists refer to rational players under a certain assumption about 
rationality—that each player is seeking a certain knowable end (Bartos). I have created a game 
with the assumption that each player wants as a large a share of the distributed capital as 
possible. My model takes as an axiom that both players know their own objectives, know those 
of their opponents, and that their opponents know that they know their objectives, ad 
infinitum (Baird). It is also contingent on the assumption that it accounts for every major 
decision-making influence. 
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Because the forecasting of particular inputs must be done, not by the game but by the 
litigator, the value of the game is not primarily its ability to make particular predictions, but 
rather its logical way of organizing data, such that the impact of subtle changes in an intricate 
and complicated process might be observed in many hypothetical scenarios. I suggest that the 
described game and mathematical models do exist but will leave the formation of 
mathematical models for further research. For now it is sufficient to say that my game may 
prove to be a useful tool for litigants and lawyers—even if it assists only in presenting, in a 
logical, dynamic format, what the players’ intuition might have already told them. 
My game is quite unique. Many people have analyzed legal negotiation, but few 
applications of game theory to legal negotiation exist. One application used old data and did 
not write an extensive form game applied to tort law (Fournier and Zuehlke). The methodology 
of my study included two steps. In order to create an effective game I needed information on 
the process of legal negotiation. When found, I used this information to create a game that 
accounts for, as much as possible, the data that might affect decision-making. The challenge 
was to account for as many variables as possible, as efficiently as possible, so as to have a 
precise but not overly-complicated game.  
I will begin my work with a description of the legal negotiation process in tort law. Next, 
I will explain the key facets and usefulness of game theory. Third, I will suggest how game 
theory might be applied to the legal negotiation of torts and solved in any particular tort case. 
Finally I will confirm that the elements of my model are, first, the definitive parts in the legal 
negotiation process, and second, part of a cohesive and complete game.  
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What are tort negotiations? 
Legal negotiations are the attempts at dispute resolution prior to a court trial. These 
disputes, or grievances, can be understood as any conflict over the law with particular regard to 
the method and degree of compensation for the injured party (Friedman). My game is 
preferential to tort law. A tort is specifically a civil wrong (thus criminal cases do not apply to 
my game) (Geraty). For this study, the selection of cases has also been limited by ruling out 
instances where insurance limits the rational action of players. This constricts the range of 
applicable cases of my game to about 25% of the aggregate set of torts (ibid). If negotiations 
are unsuccessful, the court is the final arbiter of a grievance (Friedman). However, most 
conflicts are easily reconcilable and are resolved with no outside assistance. Of the few that 
progress, the majority are resolved with the assistance of legal professionals before going to 
court. Of the remainder, many are resolved just prior to the court pronounced judgment, 
sometimes resolutions are even made during a recess of the trial, though the settlement is 
often enforced as a court judgment (Geraty). Actually, approximately 99% of all grievances are 
settled before the court issues a final verdict (Friedman).  
It is quite undesirable for either party to resort to the court for judgment (Spier). This is 
because utilizing the entire process carries with it the disincentive of court fees extended 
attorney pay and the potential for the plaintiff to receive nothing (Spier; Geraty). Because of 
this, the majority of resolutions are polarized on the litigation timeline (Geraty). If both parties 
are willing, it is usually possible to come to an agreement earlier than later in the legal dispute 
process. However, even in bitter conflict, many cases are settled just prior to the trial to avoid 
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the said disincentives (ibid). This results in a sort of inverted bell curve on the timeline for legal 
settlement against frequency. 
Another critical feature of the legal negotiation procedure is the investigative portion 
(Geraty). Legal investigation is the information-seeking portion of the negotiation process (I will 
call this phase ‘discovery’). During this time, each party seeks to find the strength of both his 
and his opponent’s arguments through a variety of discovery tools. One of the most important 
elements of discovery is the depositions of relevant neutral individuals (ibid). A witness 
account, the advice of an expert in an appropriate field, or simply the message sent by the 
plaintiff or the defendant in a deposition can change the dynamics of the negotiation (Spier). A 
particular discovery phase may also include one or more request for admissions’, 
interrogatories, or production of documents’ (Geraty). All of these affect the decision-making 
processes of the players, whether or not they settle, and how. It is important to recognize, 
simply that the discovery phase is a significant portion of legal negotiation.  
What is game theory? 
Game theory is a system of analysis for a situation dictated by the conflicting interests of 
strategic players (Baird, 1). It is described by gains and losses between cooperative players 
(sharing mutual interests) or competitive players (as in a zero-sum game) (Baird 42, 10). The 
defendant and the plaintiff in a formal legal dispute are the players in such a legal game. The 
game that I have created models the key stages in negotiations and should consequently 
predict the behavior of rational litigants in a legal dispute.  
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An outline of the basic tenets of game theory may be expressed with a simple and 
familiar example. The prisoners’ dilemma is an imperfect, single stage, simple form game 
(Baird). This is an entirely different type of game than I have created. However, it is a 
straightforward example that demonstrates the type of analytical thinking characteristic of 
game theory.  
The Dilemma is a scenario where two suspects have been apprehended for committing 
a crime (faculty.html). They are each interrogated in private (without knowledge of the other 
players’ plea) and based on their plea and the plea of the other player, a sentence is 
determined. The particular numbers given are less important than the process itself, but in our 
scenario let us outline the four possibilities as follows: If both prisoners confess, they each 
spend two years in prison. If neither confesses, they each spend six months in prison. If person 
one confesses and person two does not, person one spends one year in prison and person two 
spends ten years in prison. And finally, if person two confesses and person one does not, 
person two spends one year in prison and person one spends ten years in prison. The game can 
be displayed in a two-by-two matrix (see Figure 1) (faculty.html). 
The game is set up in such a way as to encourage confession. Neither player knows what 
the other will do. But, because the game assumptions are that each player has knowledge of 
the situation, knowledge of his or her opponent’s goals and, particularly that he or she has 
knowledge that his or her opponent has knowledge of the situation, it becomes even less likely 
that either player would choose not to confess (Baird). That is, if a rational player knows that 
his opponent knows that the wise thing to do is to confess, then the wise thing for the first 
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player to do is to act on the most likely actions of the second player. The second player will 
likely do the same. When there is a dominant strategy like this we call it the “pure strategy 
equilibrium,” or the equilibrium solution (Baird 37). Note that each player still has free will to 
act as they wish. Therefore, we do not know. We predict rational behavior. Note also, that the 
equilibrium solution is not the “best” solution for either player. It is best for both players if they 
deny the crime, but yet it is unlikely that either of them will after an evaluation of risks versus 
benefits. 
Figure 1 
A Simple Form Game—The Prisoner’s Dilemma     
   
Player Two 
Confess             Deny 
 
 
Confess  
      Player One 
   Deny 
    
  
      Years In prison (Player One, Player Two) 
 
 
  
(2, 2)   (1, 10) 
 
(10, 1)   (.5, .5) 
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a very basic game; from here this is going to seem to get 
complicated quickly. My model differs from the Dilemma in that it is a zero sum, single stage, 
imperfect, sequential, extensive form game with a potential end-game bargaining problem 
(Baird). Each of these terms is a defining characteristic of the general structure of my game—
that is, a game that represents the legal negotiation of torts. 
My game is primarily zero-sum. This means that the values of each decision for each 
player are inversely proportional to the player’s opponent. In contrast to the prisoners’ 
dilemma, where the equilibrium solutions may be better overall for both players, my game is of 
such a manner that a better solution for one player is inherently worse for the other player. 
My game is single stage (ibid). This simply means that any two players are likely to only 
encounter each other once. If players engage each other multiple times, an additional factor is 
included in the game—namely, how they played the last time. For the sake of practicality and 
brevity, I have written a single stage game. This means that the reputation of a lawyer, for 
instance, does not affect how players act.  
My game is imperfect (ibid). This means that each player has only partial information 
about his or her opponent and acts based on that information rather than the whole truth. This 
aspect is in common with the prisoner’s dilemma. However, because my game is of the 
extensive form, knowledge is progressive (ibid). This is perhaps the greatest difference between 
my game and the prisoner’s dilemma. Whereas the dilemma was a two-by two block with four 
possible solutions, my game is better represented by a tree diagram with many possible 
solutions. Each decision the players make is in a one-at-a-time series (hence, it is sequential) 
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and leads to the next decision making point. The formal decision making points in a game are 
called nodes. At each node, the condition of the game may change. The tree diagram displays a 
node by node, or “extensive form”, game (see Figure 2). In the figure, Player 1 has a choice 
between U and D. Player 2 then has a choice between U’ and D’. Note that the values of U’ and 
D’ for Player 2 are different based on Player 1’s choice of U or D and vice versa. This 
demonstrates the variability of options given to a player. We will see that this form models legal 
negotiation.  
Finally, my game has an end-game bargaining problem (Baird). This means the 
fundamental status of the game changes before the terminal node. This may occur, for 
instance, with the introduction of a third party. If this party happens to require a share also of 
the disputed resources, this can actually make the game less than zero-sum for the first two 
players. For example, if the two parties settle, the distribution of capital may be split 50-50, 40-
60, 70-30 etc. but if they introduce the court, the corresponding distributions might be 45-45-
10, 35-55-10, 65-25-10 etc., with the court taking the subjective third portions in the latter list. 
Neither party wants to share any more than they have to. So, this is where each side must 
determine whether the potential benefits outweigh the costs. A plaintiff may choose to engage 
the court with the hope of the distribution being, as an example of his or her ideal, 95-(-5)-10. 
Going to court is a risk that must be evaluated by both sides. However, if either one remains 
obstinate, the court trial is inevitable.  
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Figure 2 
Sample of an Extensive Form Game—the Tree Diagram  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Solving a Particular Case with My Predictive Model 
The game might be solved (i.e. find equilibrium nodes) for any given set of 
circumstances through backward induction. That is, I can find what would be the best solution 
at each node from an enlightened perspective, and then deduce what a rational player would 
most likely do. I can then also assign weight of settlements (particular distributions) based on 
each players calculated probability of winning and how much. This is not what they should win. 
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Rather, the calculated settlement weights are based on what the players perceive to be their 
best capital distribution and again are dependent on the accuracy of the inputs. In a just world 
capital would always be distributed based on what the truth of their condition is. We assume 
that the court, as an objective and impartial arbiter, makes just decisions. No one really knows 
the truth but an observer of a theoretical game with complete knowledge. The game does not 
take into account the probability of the court misinterpreting information.  
If both parties calculate a sufficiently similar distribution—they will settle. For instance, 
if a plaintiff is willing to settle for anything more than $45,000 and the defendant is willing to 
settle for anything less than $50,000. There is a $5,000 window of offer-acceptance or “zone of 
agreement” (Neale and Bazerman). However, if for instance, the plaintiff will settle for nothing 
less than $50,000 and the defendant will settle for nothing more than $45,000, we say there is 
no window of settlement. Just because there is a window, this does not mean that there will 
necessarily be settlement. The reasoning is simple. Negotiators will not bluntly state their most 
neutral offer, meaning, a defendant will not tell the plaintiff how high he or she would be 
willing to accept offers, and likewise, a plaintiff will not tell the defendant how low he or she 
would be willing to accept offers. If I were to continue my research to include a mathematical 
model, I would attempt to make predictions about the likelihood of the litigants meeting within 
this window. So, the existence of a window does not ensure settlement. Instead, I posit only 
that there is a positive correlation between the size of the window and the likelihood of 
settlement at any individual stage. If each player’s condition could be assessed at each stage, 
my model could quite naturally be extended to make such a prediction.  
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Elements of my Model 
I will now explain the particular elements of my model with regard to the pieces that 
compose a game in game theory. The first elements are the players. The players of my game 
include precisely one plaintiff and one defendant; however, we could perhaps also call the 
court an actionless player. Next, both players begin the game as either more responsible or 
more negligent. A future court makes this verdict, but in the meantime this decision is unknown 
to both players. They will have a general idea of how responsible they were, but they do not 
know what the relation of their responsibility is to the other player. I refer to this court verdict 
as the situation and their perception of the situation as the position or the condition of the 
players. Due to its unknown nature, players’ actions may seem erratic as they become more or 
less confident in their position (Geraty). However, a strong player does not always act strong 
and a weak player does not always act weak as we will see later.  
I described before that the legal negotiation game applied to tort law is of the 
sequential, extensive form (see Figure 3). As much as possible, players attempt to gain 
knowledge of the situation throughout the game. If a player’s knowledge of a situation has 
changed or that player believes the opposing player’s knowledge has changed, a new offer 
might be made. Because of this, one might think that there would not normally be a set 
number of nodes, but that there would be many according to each new bit of information. I do 
not need to create a node for every offer made, however. Instead, I use one node to represent 
all offers and counteroffers made by each player, under a given set of influences. In particular, 
to predict the probability of settlement we simply need the most ideal offer from each stage. 
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For each stage, I collected offers by one player into the teal box called “offer”, while the other 
player’s offers are represented by the teal box called “counteroffer”. I have not distinguished 
which player makes an offer and which player makes a counteroffer in each phase. This is left 
arbitrary. In fact, first offers can be made by either side in each phase, but the corresponding 
counteroffer must then come from the other party.  
Figure 3 
A Model Representing Tort Negotiations 
 
 
The initial, mid-game and end-game offers distinguish the three primary phases outlined 
in my game. The three great game shaping influences are, first, the strategy of players following 
a grievance, second, the introduction of new information, and third, the end-game bargaining 
problem (Geraty). The beginning of each phase is colored green in the figure. 
Player strategy dictates the first stage of the game. Players consciously or unconsciously 
choose one of two general strategies; they can play competitive or cooperative. The use of the 
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terms cooperative and competitive with respect to the players differs from the same terms as 
used to describe the type of game being played.  Based on predictions of who would be found 
more at fault, players might play cooperatively (Spier). That is, they can make the most directly 
advantageous moves. Or, in an attempt to mislead their opponent, the actor may, essentially, 
bluff about their condition. We are particularly interested in cases where offers themselves may 
be forms of counter-intelligence. A player with a so-called competitive approach utilizes the 
limited knowledge of the other player to his or her advantage (Spier). This means that even the 
most cooperative litigant cannot make unilateral decisions. If, for instance, a defendant is 
willing to settle relatively high, he or she may still be prohibited from doing so if the plaintiff 
only makes outrageous offers. Likewise, even if the same defendant continually refuses offers, 
neither can he or she make a unilateral decision. The court ensures closure.  
In a study of credible negotiation, one scholar found that in competitive negotiation the 
strategies utilized by litigators are not entirely arbitrary or impulsive (Nalebuff). In order to 
maintain credibility, a weak plaintiff cannot risk having a low first offer denied. That is, a weak 
plaintiff must begin with a competitive strategy. If he or she makes a low offer and the 
defendant denies it, the case is likely to be dropped. Also, a neutral or strong plaintiff would 
regret settling low with a defendant if the defendant had a weak case. To be safe, a plaintiff 
frequently makes intentionally high pretrial offers, mimicking the actions of a strong 
cooperative player (ibid).  
The discovery phase is the epitome of the imperfect, extensive form game. If a piece of 
evidence shows up that was before unknown, a litigant will have a corresponding change in 
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their expectations for settlement. For example, a deposition may change a player’s perception 
of their situation when a witness gives a persuasive testimony. New evidence does not 
necessarily change the window, however, if there is a common shift in the expectations of both 
players. This might occur, for instance, if the second player knows that the first player took a 
deposition with the said effect. That is, with a new mutual knowledge, a plaintiff might have his 
or her case strengthened but the defendant would then also have a corresponding rise in the 
amount he or she is willing to concede. The same reasoning applies if the plaintiff’s case is 
weakened, the defendant’s case is strengthened, or the defendant’s case is weakened. So with 
new information there will be a change in the standard for settlement with the possibility of a 
fluctuated window.  
If we from here assume one-sided intelligence, we can explore the possibilities of a 
change in the window. If a player has his or her case strengthened, this would necessarily 
narrow any potential window, such that a plaintiff would expect more or a defendant would 
expect to concede less. If a player has his or her case weakened, this will necessarily widen the 
potential window by the same reasoning. These one-sided discoveries are of particular interest 
in finding the likelihood of settlement, while new mutual intelligence would be useful in 
determining the magnitude of a change in settlement expectations.  
The initial and mid-game offers are fairly similar in that players can accept or deny 
entirely as they find prudent, whereas the end-game offers are made with the increased 
pressure of an impending trial date (Spier). The evaluation of potential benefits must be 
weighed against the continued court costs to determine whether the players’ condition will 
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ever be revealed by the court. This again translates into litigants settling for an amount that is 
not within their original standards. The bargaining problem takes place when the zero-sum 
attribute of the end-game is threatened by imminent court intervention. Litigants have an extra 
incentive to settle before going to trial, because when a third party enters the game it 
translates into deadweight loss creating Pareto-inefficiency. This changes the dynamic of the 
game and gives an opportunity for one or both players to improve their positions. 
This bargaining problem can have a profound effect on the outcome of a case. As an 
example, let us assume the previous standards for which there was no window of settlement—
a plaintiff demanding $50,000 and a Defendant unwilling to settle above $45,000. When court 
intervention (with the associated lawyerly fees) is imminent, players recalculate their potential 
gains or losses. If we assume a modest $10,000 will be deducted from both players, then even if 
both players were to accept offers on their thresholds, their new efficiency standard for the 
plaintiff is $50,000 - $10,000 = $40,000 and for the defendant it is -$45,000 - $10,000 =                
-$55,000 (note that the defendant is intent on minimizing losses, hence the negative value). So, 
a nonexistent (or, -$5000) window expands in this case by $20,000 to a positive $15,000 pretrial 
window. The phenomenon of late negotiation settlements is thus the action of rational litigants 
and an essential element of my game. 
If at any these three stages the two parties accept and choose to settle, the game ends. 
Thus any of the dark blue boxes could be a terminal node. If the players do not agree on a 
distribution (if they do not settle) they will proceed to the next node, and the next, and the 
next—in each phase offering and accepting or denying an offer. The game progresses 
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sequentially with each denial of an offer (or set of offers). The purple denial boxes are 
progressive boxes. The official court judgment is the terminal point of games that would 
otherwise not end.  
Conclusions 
 The model that most precisely applies to tort negotiations is a zero sum, single stage, 
imperfect, sequential, extensive form game with a potential end-game bargaining problem. The 
three phases of the game are distinguished as the introduction of player strategy, the 
introduction of new information, and the introduction of the court. The game accounts for the 
major influences of a very complicated and abstract process in a concise, precise and analyzable 
way.  The model of tort negotiations I am presenting is an innovation for future study. If the 
game is advanced to include mathematical functions it could quantify the probability of 
settlement and predict distribution values at different stages. The game operates under many 
critical assumptions, most significant of which is that its accuracy in specific cases is entirely 
subject to the litigators’ ability to forecast inputs. 
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